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Abstract: Recent reforms in the Ukrainian audit market should have been activated the 
competitiveness in the market. This paper explores concentration in the Ukrainian audit 
market in order to analyze the efficiency of these reforms. In this study, the annual data 
from the Audit Chamber of Ukraine over the period 2007 – 2019 is used. Using various 
statistical methods and specific market concentration indicators, the present study finds the 
pieces of evidence in favor of high concentration of the Ukrainian audit market and the 
failure of the reforms. The situation with the competitiveness only gets worse after them. 
The results of the study provide suggestions for improving the situation concerning the 
rising of market integrity principles, qualification of auditors in Ukrainian firms, and 
strengthening monitoring of audit quality in B4 and mid-tier companies. 
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Introduction 
Competitiveness is a cornerstone of the market economy. Any market cannot be 
efficient without proper counteraction between its participants (Vargas et al., 2019; 
Vnukova et al., 2020; Kolodiziev et al., 2021; Setyo et al., 2021). The audit market 
is not an exception. Still, it is one of the most concentrated markets. A high level of 
concentration provides a potential negative impact on audit quality and the 
reliability of companies’ financial statements in the interests of users. 
A recent example of the poor quality of audits conducted by the “Big 4” (B4) audit 
firms in the UK is the findings of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), which is 
audited in particular. In 2018, KPMG, PwC, Deloitte and EY had audited 918 
listed companies subject to the public interest. 40% of serious cased problems in 
these companies were identified (Marriage, 2018). Half of the audits were 
conducted by KPMG; among the companies, FTSE 350 did not meet the quality 
standards of FRC (FRC, 2018). Despite a slight decrease in audit market 
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concentration, B4 remains the auditor for 97% of FTSE 350 companies, according 
to Oxera (2018). 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) reported that in the USA, 
B4 companies are becoming “too big or too few to fail”, which creates additional 
regulatory pressure and threats of free competition in the market and audit quality. 
In particular, in the telecommunications sector, 92% of S&P 500 companies are 
audited by one of the B4, and in the energy, raw materials and IT sectors, the share 
of companies audited by two auditors from B4 is 75%. 
According to estimates of competition level in the audit market in 2015-2018 in the 
EU, there is a consistently high level of concentration (ICAEW, 2021), and the 
share of B4 companies in the audit of public interest entities reaches 66% in 2018 
(European Commission, 2021). 
The audit market with high competitiveness is characterized by better quality 
standards, lower audit fees and higher reporting transparency. That is why audit 
market concentration is an urgent issue both to regulators worldwide and 
practitioners and scholars.  
Ukrainian audit market is a fascinating and unique case because it allows seeing in 
almost real-time regime the efficiency of reforms in the audit market and their 
influence on the market concentration. Reforms in the Ukrainian audit market 
started in 1993 with the adoption of international standards of audit and system of 
quality control. But till 2016, these reforms cannot provide conditions for a 
competitive market. Meanwhile, the level of shadowing in the Ukrainian economy 
remains high (Bilan et al., 2020b), with an actual level near 30% by the official 
data, even considering a downward trend starting from 2015 (Mishchuk et al., 
2020). Due to this reason, the need for audit market development is obvious too. 
Makarenko and Plastun (2016) provide pieces of evidence in favor of the quasi-
competitive nature of the Ukrainian audit market. 
Since 2017 another wave of reforms was realized in the Ukrainian audit market. 
The reform of the Ukrainian audit market carried out in 2017, started with the 
adoption of the Law “On audit of financial statements and auditing activities” 
21.12.2017 № 2258-VIII that is consistent with the key areas of restructuring of the 
European audit market, initiated in 2014 with the EU Directive 2014/56 / EU and 
Regulation (EU) № 537/2014 adoption. 
The emphasis in these reforms was placed on strengthening the responsibility of 
auditors for the quality of services provided, requirements for their independence, 
rotation, joint provision of audit and non-audit services, conducting a mandatory 
audit of public interest entities. Collectively, these areas of reform are designed not 
only to increase the transparency of corporate reporting of auditors’ clients but also 
to promote better and more competitive audit services, reducing market 
concentration. 
This study is devoted to the assessment of the concentration level in the Ukrainian 
audit after implementation of EU Directive 2014/56 /EU and Regulation (EU) № 
537/2014 into national practice. It is a logical continuation of the previous study by 
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Makarenko and Plastun (2016) and is an attempt to investigate the competitive 
parameters of the Ukrainian audit market after its reform based on a number of 
specific parameters and metrics (Kneysler et al., 2019). 
Literature Review 
Audit market concentration: the views of regulators and scientists 
Promoting free competition in audit markets has been the focus of regulators for a 
long time. The negative impact of audit market concentration on the audit quality 
and the audit services fee, systemic market risk is outlined in EC Green Paper 
(2010), Oxera (2006; 2018) and OECD (2010). There is a piece of evidence that 
increasing the audit companies’ concentration can lead to an increase in 
remuneration for services rendered. Instead, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2003; 2008) also provides conclusions on the lack of evidence of the 
negative impact of audit market concentration. 
Following the reform of the audit market in the EU, the conclusions of regulators 
on the degree of audit market concentration and the need to ensure a competitive 
basis for the provision of audit services (ICAEW, 2021;European Commission, 
2021) are gaining considerable weight. As a result, the audit market transparency is 
discussed by some researchers (Caridad et al., 2020) as it has been proved that 
companies can have differences in ratings while comparing several agencies’ 
evaluations. 
Similar emphases are contained in scientific sources published before the start of 
reforms in the EU audit market (Boone et al., 2012; Casterella et al., 2004; Francis 
et al., 2005, and Dunn et al., 2011) and after their implementation (Gerakos and 
Syverson, 2015; Gunn et al., 2019; and Bengoriz et al., 2020). 
Some papers, in contrast, indicate a lack of connection between the concentration 
processes in the audit market and the quality of audit services (Numan and 
Willekens, 2012; Newton et al., 2013; Harris, 2017; Ohlsson and Carlsson, 2018; 
Hallman et al., 2020; Willekens et al., 2020; and Aggreh, 2019). The absence of the 
obvious dependencies may be caused by the lack of high-skilled professionals, 
which is one of the typical obstacles for the Ukrainian companies’ development 
(Bilan et al., 2020a). 
Hallman et al. (2020) state that there is no evidence that the concentration of the 
local audit market is related to competitive bidding. Ohlsson and Carlsson (2018) 
state that companies prove the lack of relationship between market concentration 
and audit quality on the example of Swedish. In the study of Aggreh (2019) the 
relationship between these parameters is not statistically significant in all cases. 
To sum it up, before and after the reform, there are apologists for tougher 
regulatory measures to increase audit market competition and curb the expansion 
of B4 to ensure the quality of audit services. In this study, it considers the negative 
impact of audit market concentration processes on its quality and emphasizes the 
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In Ukraine, systematic studies of the audit market and its reform are presented in a 
limited number of scientific papers. Systematic coverage of market transformation 
under the influence of regulatory measures in the context of promoting audit 
quality is presented in the works of Redko (2009, 2020) and Shendryhorenko and 
Shevchenko (2018). Studying the parameters of the audit market in Ukraine, its and 
concentration are presented by Petrakov (2013) who substantiates the quasi-
competitiveness of the audit market in Ukraine based on the theory of Baumol 
(1982). Kochin (2020), Shulga (2019) focus their research on the study of the audit 
market after its reform. At the same time, the quantitative assessment of the audit 
market in Ukraine from the standpoint of its competitive structure and the 
definition of the role of market reforms in these works is insufficient. 
Concentration in the Ukrainian audit market: regulatory aspect and conjuncture 
review 
The focus of EU Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation (EU) № 537/2014 on 
strengthening the competitiveness of the European audit services market, their 
quality and restoring the confidence of users of financial statements in financial 
markets is manifested in stimulating the development of second-tier audit firms, 
small and medium audit firms. The new Law “On Auditing Financial Statements 
and Auditing Activities” adopted in Ukraine in 2017 has a similar focus. 
Clearing the market from audit micro-companies in Ukraine, which demonstrate 
low-quality standards and violations of professional ethics, is a necessary step 
towards reforming auditing activities in line with high auditing quality standards in 
the EU Directive. However, the effect of the introduction of the new law may be 
reversed and lead to further consolidation of the audit services market and 
narrowing of competition in it. 
Such rules, based on the relevant provisions of Directive 2014/56 / EU and 
Regulation (EU) № 537/2014, include: 
 procedural requirements for performing assurance engagements: limiting the 
statutory audit duration, appointing and changing the engagement partner, rotating 
audit firms and conducting joint audits; 
 system requirements: reform in the system of public and professional audit 
oversight, audit quality control and inspection, separation of audit and non-audit 
services, insurance of auditor’s civil liability, formation of audit committees and 
tender selection procedures for auditors; 
 qualification requirements: supplementing the register of auditing entities with a 
section that includes entities that have the right to conduct a statutory audit of 
financial statements and a statutory audit of financial statements of public interest 
entities, the procedure for their certification and improvement of qualification 
requirements and independence requirements. 
High qualification requirements are determined by the multiplicity of audit 
objectives covering different areas in business activity (Krismiaji and Surifah, 
2020; Suprianto et al., 2019). 
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An overview of the impact of these reforms in the audit market on its quantitative 
parameters is presented in Table 1 and Fig. 1. They illustrate a narrowing audit 
market competition in Ukraine. 
 
Table 1. Aggregate data on the audit companies’ differentiation by the volume of 





Number of auditing entities, units 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Volume not 
specified 
167 161 172 147 




581 486 419 
337 228 181 149 178 102 
From100,1 
to 200,0 
341 330 275 238 
183 136 126 115 93 86 
From200,1 
to 300,0 
237 198 155 153 
121 106 98 81 70 101 
From300,1 
to 400,0 
143 113 106 95 
94 92 81 57 57 58 
From400,1 
to 500,0 
152 119 85 78 
67 43 69 66 37 41 
From500,1 
to 1000,0 
162 175 173 162 
154 151 152 174 191 167 
From1000,1 
to 10000,0 
74 107 148 150 
146 175 188 208 233 270 
More than 
10 000,0 
8 8 9 10 
10 13 15 18 20 22 
Total  
2040 1792 1609 1452 1272 1071 1002 944 949 916 
 
Against the background of a reduction in the total number of audit entities, such a 
narrowing is manifested in a constant reduction in the share of audit entities with 
relatively small volumes of services provided (up to UAH 500,000), from 37% to 
11% of all entities. 
2021 
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Figure 1: Share of audit firms with minimum and maximum volumes of audit services 
rendered (thousand UAH) for 2010-2019 in Ukraine, % (compiled by the authors 
according to ACU (2010-2019)) 
 
The illustrations show the consolidation of the market in favour of large audit 
firms, including B4 and mid-tier companies operating in more valuable segments 
of the Ukrainian audit market (from UAH ths. 500,000), and the frequency of 
which is steadily increasing. In recent years, it exceeds half of all services provided 
by all companies in the market. 
This determines the purpose and importance of the study -- to assess the level of 
concentration of the audit market in Ukraine before and after the adoption of the 
Law “On Auditing Financial Statements and Auditing”. 
Data and Methodology 
Annual data from the Audit Chamber of Ukraine (http://www.apu.com.ua/pro-apu) 
was used in the present study. The data was collected for the period of 01.01.2007 
to 31.12.2019. Competitiveness of the Ukrainian audit market was assessed based 
on the following indicators: number of reports provided to the Audit Chamber of 
Ukraine (ACU); number of orders; actual size of the provided services; average 
costs per order; number of orders per company; average income per company.  
These indicators were analysed in the regional breakdown. It includes 26 regions of 
Ukraine. Data for temporary occupied territories (Crimea and parts of the Donetsk 
and Lugansk regions) were used until 2014 (last year when they were an actual part 
of Ukraine). 
Considering the above, the following hypotheses have been tested: 


























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
The share of firms with a volume of 500.1 and more than 1000.0 
The share of firms with a volume of 0.1 to 100.0  
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H2: Ukrainian audit market is more competitive after reforms. 
Different methods and techniques were used to test the hypotheses. The methods 
and techniques used in this study are average analysis, non-parametrical Kruskal-
Wallis test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality, ANOVA analysis, specific 
indicators used to analyse the competitiveness of the market (Comprehensive 
concentration index (CCI), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index - HHI), Lorenz curve, 
Rosenbluth index, Entropy index, Gini coefficient, Lerner index, concentration 
ratios etc. (Plastun et al., 2018). 
Average analysis was used to provide preliminary estimations of market 
competitiveness. Next statistical tests were used to find whether detected 
differences are statistically significant. For the case of normal data distribution, 
ANOVA analysis was used (parametrical tests). Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 
used for normality to define the data type of distribution. The data distribution was 
not normal, so Kruskal-Wallis tests (non-parametric) were used. Kruskal-Wallis 
test was used instead of the standard Mann-Whitney test because of the large 
number of the analysed groups (26). 
The Null Hypothesis (H0) is as follows: data belong to the same general 
population. If the null hypothesis is rejected, evidence favoring statistically 
significant differences in the analyzed groups of data will be provided. This means 
analysed groups of data belong to different populations. In this case, it can be 
concluded that the market is not freely competitive.  
If the null hypothesis is rejected, the next step of analysis will be followed, i.e., 
specific indicators to analyse the competitiveness of the market are calculated. 
Empirical Results 
The authors start with the normality tests in order to define the type of statistical 
tests (parametrical or non-parametrical). To do this, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 
applied. The results are presented in Table 2.  
 
































statistic (D)  0,31 0,32 0.42 0,33 0,17 0,24 
p value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Null 
hypothesis rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected 
Conclusion Data are not normally distributed 
2021 
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statistic (D)  0,35 0,34 0,44 0,22 0,13 0,26 
p value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,30 0,00 
Null 












As can be seen, data are not normally distributed (with the only exception: case of 
the “number of orders per company, units” after reforms), and therefore non-
parametric tests should be applied. The absence of differences in results for the pre-
reform and post-reform data sets have evidenced indirectly in favor of the absence 
of significant changes in data sets due to reforms. 
Next, the researchers have performed a simple average analysis. It provides 
preliminary estimations of the inequality in the Ukrainian audit market. The results 
show significant geographical inequalities in the Ukrainian audit market. Kyiv and 
Kyiv region dominate the market with much higher values than the results from the 
other regions. This is true for most of the analyzed indicators, except “Number of 
orders per company”, which is distributed more or less evenly.  
In order to confirm preliminary conclusions from the average analysis, non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests for difference are performed. The results obtained 
in the test are presented in Table 3.  
 




























Adjusted H 276,28 278,48 341,48 191,60 243,06 201,12 
d.f. 24 24 24 24 24 24 
P value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Critical value 36,41 36,41 36,41 36,41 36,41 36,41 
Null 
hypothesis rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected 
After reforms 
Adjusted H 71,03 68,92 72,46 64,58 8.10 71,58 
d.f. 24 24 24 24 24 24 
P value 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Critical value 36,41 36,41 36,41 36,41 1.96 36,41 
Null 
hypothesis rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected 
Note: For the case of number of orders per company, units for the after reforms data 
ANOVA analysis applied because these data are normally distributed 
 
According to the results, data from different regions belong to the different general 
populations. This is indirect evidence in favor of insufficient competitiveness in the 
Ukrainian audit market. 
Further, pieces of evidence related to the competitiveness of the Ukrainian audit 
market are generated based on the analysis of specific indicators of market 
concentration, including Concentration ratios (CR1 and CR4), Rosenbluth Index, 
Hirschman Index, Comprehensive concentration index (ССІ), Entropy index and 
Gini coefficient. An overview of these indicators is presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Market concentration indicators: overview   
Indicator Short description Interpretation 
Concentration ratio  
This ratio measures the level of 
market control of the largest 
market participants. It shows 
the degree of market 
concentration.   
0% - no concentration -- means 
perfect competition; 
0%-50% - low concentration -- market 
competition ranges from perfect 
competition to an oligopoly; 
50%-80% - medium concentration – 
usually, it is typical for the oligopoly; 
80%-100% - high concentration -- 
market ranges from an oligopoly to a 
monopoly; 
100% - total concentration -- the 




Index (HHI) measures the 
size of market participants 
related to the whole market. 
0 – no concentration;  
0 - 0,1 – low concentration;  
0,10 - 0,18 – medium concentration;  
> 0,18 – high concentration. 
Rosenbluth 
Index 
This index is based on the 
market share and the rank of 
market participants. 
It ranges from 1/n to 1. The higher 
the index is, the more monopolized 
the market is.  
Comprehensive 
concentration 
index (ССІ)  
Reflects both relative 
dispersion and absolute 
magnitude of the biggest 
market participant share 
CCI ranges from 0 to 1. The higher 
the CCI is, the less competitive is 
market. 
Entropy index 
Index measures the 
distribution of market values 
among market participants.   
The lower the values are, the higher 
the market concentration is. 
Gini coefficient 
The Gini coefficient 
measures the inequality 
among values of a frequency 
Ranges from 0 to 1. From perfect 
competition (0) to monopoly (1).  
2021 
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distribution (for example, 
market shares). 
Lerner index 
Index estimates the power of 
a single market participant. 
The idea of this index is as 
follows: the more prices in 
the market differ from the 
marginal costs, the less 
competitive the market is. 
Ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the 
index is, the greater the market 
power is. Lerner index equals 0 
(means any market participant has 
no market power) in a perfectly 
competitive market. 
  
Summary of the results is provided in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Market concentration analysis: the case of 2019   
Indicator 
Number of reports 
provided to the ACU 
Number of orders 




















High concentration High concentration High concentration 
Rosenbluth Index 

























As can be seen, the level of regional competitiveness in the Ukrainian audit market 
is very low—these results evidence in favor of the highly concentrated nature of 
the Ukrainian audit market. 
In order to see the evolution of competition in the Ukrainian audit market caused 
by reforms, the authors have compared average values of the market concentration 
indicators for pre-reform data (2007-2017) and post-reform data (2018-2019). The 
results are presented in Table 6. 
 




to the ACU 
Number of orders 
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Concentration ratio (CR1) 0,42 0,50 0,43 0,48 0,77 0,82 
Concentration ratio (CR4) 0,62 0,65 0,62 0,67 0,88 0,9 
Hirschman Index (HHI) 0,2 0,27 0,22 0,26 0,61 0,67 
Rosenbluth Index 0,12 0,14 0,12 0,17 0,41 0,57 
Comprehensive 
concentration index (ССІ)  
0,43 0,41 0,45 0,41 0,78 0,8 
Entropy index 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,04 0,03 
Gini coefficient 0,47 0,43 0,49 0,48 0,73 0,63 
 
As can be seen for most cases, the situation worsens: the level of competitiveness 
has decreased.   
These conclusions are confirmed by the Lerner Index analysis. It is very close to 1. 
According to Lerner index interpretation, the Ukrainian audit market is highly 
monopolized (marginal costs are extremely low compared with the prices in the 
market, which is possible only in market monopoly), and the situation gets worse 
after reforms. 
Additional pieces of evidence are provided using visual interpretation of the 
inequality (Lorenz curve). Lorenz curve represents the market inequality in the 
form of a chart. On the x-axis, the cumulative percentage of companies is 
presented. On the y-axis, the cumulative percentage of market share is presented. A 
market of perfect competition is characterized by the bisector from the start of 
coordinate system. Deviation from this bisector visualizes market inequality. 
In case of the Ukrainian audit market actual lines are very far from the ideal 
distribution (low competitiveness with high inequality), and the situation has 
worsened after reforms. 
To sum up, the highly concentrated nature of the Ukrainian audit market and 
dominance of the Big 4 audit companies have not been changed after reforms. The 
surprising fact is that situation gets even worse. From the point of competitiveness, 
the authors find strong evidence in favor of reforms’ failure.  
Conclusions and policy implications 
Regulatory measures to improve the quality of auditing and the level of 
competition in its market in the EU (2014) and Ukraine (2017), as shown by the 
analysis of reporting and statistical sources, did not yield significant positive 
results. 
The limitations of this study on the impact of audit market reform on its 
concentration in Ukraine are existed because of insufficiently long time after the 
reform. However, 7 years of EU experience show that market concentration 
processes intensify even after the reform. 
Reforms in the Ukrainian audit market provided in 2017 are supposed to transform 
it into more competitive. This paper aims to see whether competition in the 
2021 
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Ukrainian audit market has increased. To do this, annual data from the Audit 
Chamber of Ukraine over the period of 2007-2019 is used. Two hypotheses are 
tested in this research: Ukrainian audit market was highly concentrated before 
reforms (H1); Ukrainian audit market is more competitive after reforms (H2). The 
calculations of concentration level are based on the analysis of the following 
indicators in the regional breakdown: number of reports provided to the ACU; 
number of orders; actual size of the provided services; average costs per order; 
number of orders per company; average income per company. 
Using geographic (regional) research approach based on a variety of statistical 
methods, including average analysis, non-parametrical Kruskal-Wallis test, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality, ANOVA analysis, as well as specific 
market concentration indicators (concentration ratios, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
Comprehensive concentration index, Rosenbluth index, Gini coefficient, Lorenz 
curve, Entropy index, Lerner index,), pieces of evidence in favor of increasing of 
concentration in the Ukrainian audit market and failure of the reforms are found. 
The situation with competitiveness only gets worse after reforms.  
One of the ways to reform the audit market, which has an ambiguous impact on its 
market concentration, is to strengthen the qualification requirements for auditors, 
including some auditors who have the right to conduct statutory audits of public 
interest entities. On the one hand, stricter qualification requirements create the 
basis for improving the competence of auditors and the quality of their services 
(Santosa et al., 2020). On the other hand, they indirectly contribute to market 
consolidation and redistribution of existing public interest companies favoring B4 
companies, mid-tier companies and the largest Ukrainian audit companies. 
It is believed that promoting the development of domestic auditing entities with an 
emphasis on improving the quality of audit services provided, the level of 
qualification and education of their staff is a key step in ensuring market 
competition. ESG disclosure can be another aspect of market competition (Plastun 
et al., 2019) as well as corporate governance (Walid and Soliman, 2020) 
In addition, the process of monitoring the quality control of audit services in the 
market should be intensified, and in particular, be even more stringent for B4 and 
mid-tier companies. The scale of errors of these companies has a more devastating 
effect on the audit quality as a whole and the confidence of users of financial 
statements. 
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REFORMY I KONKURENCYJNOŚĆ NA UKRAIŃSKIM RYNKU 
AUDYTÓW 
 
Streszczenie: Ostatnie reformy na ukraińskim rynku audytorskim powinny pobudzić 
konkurencyjność na rynku. Niniejszy artykuł bada koncentrację na ukraińskim rynku 
audytorskim w celu analizy skuteczności tych reform. W niniejszym opracowaniu 
wykorzystano dane roczne Izby Obrachunkowej Ukrainy za lata 2007 – 2019. Korzystając 
z różnych metod statystycznych i określonych wskaźników koncentracji rynku, niniejsze 
badanie znajduje dowody na korzyść wysokiej koncentracji ukraińskiego rynku 
audytorskiego i niepowodzenia reform. Sytuacja z konkurencyjnością tylko się po nich 
pogarsza. Wyniki badania dostarczają propozycji poprawy sytuacji w zakresie podnoszenia 
zasad uczciwości rynku, kwalifikacji biegłych rewidentów w firmach ukraińskich oraz 
wzmocnienia monitoringu jakości badania w firmach B4 i mid-tier. . 
Słowa kluczowe: rynek audytu, konkurencja, koncentracja, reformy, audyt. 
 
乌克兰审计市场的改革和竞争力 
 
摘要：乌克兰审计市场最近的改革应该已经激活了市场竞争力。本文探讨了乌克兰审
计市场的集中度，以分析这些改革的效率。在本研究中，使用了乌克兰审计署在 2007 
年至2019年期间的年度数据。本研究使用各种统计方法和具体的市场集中度指标，发
现了有利于乌克兰审计市场高度集中和改革失败的证据。在他们之后，竞争力的情况
只会变得更糟。研究结果为改善乌克兰公司市场诚信原则、审计师资格以及加强对B4
和中型公司审计质量的监控等方面的情况提供了建议。 
关键词：审计市场，竞争，集中，改革，审计。 
